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TAKING A STAND ON TAKING THE STAND: THE
EFFECT OF A PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD ON
THE DECISION TO TESTIFY AND ON
TRIAL OUTCOMES
Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans†

This Article uses unique data from over 300 criminal trials in four
large counties to study the relations between the existence of a prior criminal
record and defendants testifying at trial, between defendants testifying at
trial and juries’ learning about criminal records, and between juries’ learning about criminal records and their decisions to convict or acquit. Sixty
percent of defendants without criminal records testified, compared to fortyfive percent with criminal records. For testifying defendants with criminal
records, juries learned of those records in about half the cases. Juries rarely
learned about criminal records unless defendants testified. After controlling
for evidentiary strength and other factors, statistically significant associations exist (1) between the existence of a criminal record and the decision to
testify at trial, (2) between the defendant’s testifying at trial and the jury’s
learning about the defendant’s prior record, and (3), in cases with weak
evidence, between the jury’s learning of a criminal record and conviction.
For cases with strong evidence against defendants, learning of criminal
records is not strongly associated with conviction rates. Juries appear to rely
on criminal records to convict when other evidence in the case normally
would not support conviction. Use of prior-record evidence may therefore
lead to erroneous convictions. We also find little evidence that prior-record
information influences credibility. This casts doubt on the historical justification for prior-record evidence: its presumed effect on defendant-as-witness
credibility. Prosecutors and judges should consider the increased likelihood of
erroneous conviction based on the use of prior convictions in decisions to
prosecute and in evidentiary rulings.
† Theodore Eisenberg is Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor
of Statistical Sciences, Cornell University, Myron Taylor Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853; e-mail: tedeisenberg@lawschool.cornell.edu. Valerie Hans is Professor of Law, Cornell Law School,
Myron Taylor Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853; e-mail: valerie.hans@cornell.edu. Drafts of this Article were presented at the 2007 Law and Society Association Meeting, Berlin, and faculty
workshops at Cornell Law School, University of Illinois College of Law, and NYU School of
Law. Data gathering was supported by Grant No. 98-IJ-CX-0048, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or
policies of the U.S. Department of Justice or the National Center for State Courts. We
thank Sherry Colb, Michael Heise, David Hoffman, Sally Lloyd-Bostock, Jeffrey Rachlinski,
and Catherine Sharkey for comments on earlier drafts and Cornell Law School librarian
Julie Jones for research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
The evidentiary treatment of a defendant’s prior criminal record
is one of the most important issues for the criminal justice system and
for the day-to-day conduct of criminal cases. Some pressure to testify
and deny guilt likely exists in almost every case. Adjudicators naturally
want to hear defendants provide their own accounts of involvement or
lack of involvement in crimes. Not testifying in one’s own defense
may influence a trial’s outcome notwithstanding the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against self-incrimination. Prosecutors, until prohibited from doing so, argued that a defendant’s failure to testify was
evidence of guilt.1 In a less direct violation of the Fifth Amendment,
prosecutors may argue that the defendant failed to rebut particular
evidence, even if the only reasonable way to do so was through the
defendant’s testifying.2 Having a prior criminal record must be considered when a defendant is deciding whether to testify. Indeed, a
1
See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 610–11 (1965). Until at least 1961, the
common law rule prohibiting defendants, as interested parties, from testifying on behalf of
themselves remained in force in Georgia but had been abolished throughout the rest of
the common law world. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 570, 574 (1961).
2
E.g., United States v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir. 1996).
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principal reason defendants decline to testify is the existence of prior
criminal records.3
All U.S. jurisdictions allow the use of some criminal convictions to
impeach the credibility of a witness.4 Indeed, the impeachment of
witnesses with their prior records was permitted at common law as
early as the seventeenth century.5 The existence of felony (and some
other) convictions led to the inference that the witness was highly
likely to lie under oath. Early on, defendants who were convicted
felons were completely prohibited from taking the stand because their
testimony was seen as having no credibility. Over time, the prohibition was eventually eased to permit defendants with records to testify,
yet simultaneously to allow the impeachment of defendants with their
prior convictions.
When to allow the fact finder to learn of a prior criminal record
is an important evidentiary topic because a prior record is understandably thought to promote convictions. Evidentiary rules try to balance
a defendant’s interest in testifying and the prejudicial effect of impeaching a defendant’s testimony using prior convictions. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) allows impeachment by prior
convictions “if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused.”6
3
See, e.g., Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 292–93 (1981) (reciting a conference
with the judge during which the defendant decided not to testify in his own defense; counsel advised the defendant during the conference that his experience indicated that impeachment with prior offenses is “‘a heavy thing; it is very serious, and I think juries take it
very seriously’”); see also John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior
Record—Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 486, 490–91
(2008) (finding that 91% of factually innocent defendants with prior records declined to
testify and that counsel in these cases reported that the primary reason was to avoid jury
bias stemming from the prior record).
4
See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 265–95 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing generally impeachment with past convictions); 3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 980, at 828 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970) (“It has therefore been universally
acknowledged that proof of a crime by record of a judgment of conviction may be
made . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
5
See Fisher, supra note 4, at 266–69 (describing history and rationale of impeachment rule); Roger C. Park, Impeachment with Evidence of Prior Convictions, 36 SW. U. L. REV.
793, 793–801 (2008) (describing history and current status of rules regarding impeachment with criminal record); H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence:
Seeing Through the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 795–803 (1993) (describing history of rule
regarding impeachment with criminal record); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to
Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 869–77
(1982) (describing and criticizing rules allowing impeachment with criminal record).
6
FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). Rule 609(a) reads:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the character for truthfulness of a witness,

(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which
the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted

R
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Although questions relating to the evidentiary treatment of prior
criminal records have been the object of judicial, legislative, and
scholarly attention for decades, they remain of vital importance.
Every year, trial judges exercise substantial discretion about the admissibility of prior records in thousands of criminal cases, and prosecutors and police are undoubtedly influenced by the existence of prior
records in charging and arrest decisions. Moreover, questions of
prior-record admissibility remain on legislative and public policy agendas.7 Judges’ balancing of the probative value of evidence versus possible prejudice and Executive Branch decision makers’ behavior
should be based on the best possible information about the impact of
criminal records. More importantly, the prejudicial effect of a prior
criminal record may contribute to the increasingly visible problem of
erroneous convictions.8
Limited empirical analysis exists of defendants’ decisions to testify or of the effect of prior criminal records on trial outcomes in real
jury trials. This Article uses a unique data set gathered by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) under a grant from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to explore when criminal defendants
testify and the effect of that testimony on jury verdicts. To summarize
of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted regardless of the punishment, if it readily can be determined that establishing the elements of the crime required proof or admission of an act of
dishonesty or false statement by the witness.
FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
7
See, e.g., N.Y. Assem. Bill 6744, 230th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., §§ 16, 17 (N.Y. 2007);
Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused’s Criminal History: The Trouble With Rule 404(b), 78
TEMP. L. REV. 201, 242–53 (2005) (examining courts’ application of Rule 404(b) to admissibility of “uncharged misconduct evidence” and suggesting an alternative approach);
Tamara Larsen, Comment, Sexual Violence is Unique: Why Evidence of Other Crimes Should Be
Admissible in Sexual Assault and Child Molestation Cases, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 177 (2006).
8
See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 523–24 (2005) (reporting 340 exonerations from 1989
through 2003); Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction: Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 927,
956 (2008); Talia Roitberg Harmon, Predictors of Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 18
JUST. Q. 949, 949–50 (2001) (“Capital punishment and wrongful convictions are receiving
increased nationwide media attention.”); Talia Roitberg Harmon & William S. Lofquist,
Too Late for Luck: A Comparison of Post-Furman Exonerations and Executions of the Innocent, 51
CRIME & DELINQ. 498, 509–10 (2005); Tony G. Poveda, Estimating Wrongful Convictions, 18
JUST. Q. 689, 689–90 (2001) (discussing recent scholarship on the extent of wrongful convictions); Robert J. Ramsey & James Frank, Wrongful Conviction: Perceptions of Criminal Justice
Professionals Regarding the Frequency of Wrongful Conviction and the Extent of System Errors, 53
CRIME & DELINQ. 436, 436–37 (2007); The Innocence Project, Facts on Post-Conviction
DNA Exonerations, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php# (last visited
Mar. 23, 2009). For an innovative effort to assess trial accuracy, see Bruce D. Spencer,
Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 305 (2007).
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our findings, 60% of defendants without criminal records testified,
compared to 45% with criminal records. For testifying defendants
with criminal records, juries learned of those records in about half the
cases. Juries rarely learned about criminal records unless defendants
testified. Statistically significant associations exist (1) between the
existence of a criminal record and the decision to testify at trial, (2)
between the defendant’s testifying at trial and the jury’s learning
about the defendant’s prior record, and (3), in cases with weak evidence, between the jury’s learning of a criminal record and conviction. For cases with strong evidence against defendants, learning of
criminal records is not associated with conviction rates. Juries appear
to rely on criminal records to convict when other evidence in the case
normally would not support conviction. The effect in otherwise weak
cases is substantial and can increase the probability of conviction to
over 50% when the probability of conviction in similar cases without
criminal records is less than 20%. We find no evidence that priorrecord evidence influences credibility. Given growing concern about
the risk of erroneous convictions, judges, prosecutors, and police
should consider this information in making decisions relating to prior
criminal records.
Part I of this Article reviews prior related research, and Part II
describes the data. Part III reports the results relating to defendants’
testifying and juries’ learning of criminal records. Part IV reports on
the association between juries’ learning of criminal records and conviction rates. The Article concludes with a discussion of policy
implications.
I
PRIOR RESEARCH ON DEFENDANT TESTIMONY
EFFECT OF CRIMINAL RECORD

AND THE

From a theoretical perspective, there are several ways in which
knowledge of a criminal record might affect a decision maker.9 First,
such knowledge could function as the legal rules governing its use
suggest it usually should, by affecting the credibility of the defendant
as a witness in the proceedings. The limiting instruction that typically
accompanies the provision of criminal-record information notes that
the record should be used in assessing the defendant’s credibility
rather than inferring the defendant’s guilt in the present offense.10
Second, a decision maker might use a defendant’s criminal record to
categorize the defendant as a bad person, a person of poor character.
In other words, a negative halo effect might operate. Indeed, studies
9
See Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the
Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235, 237–38 (1976).
10
See FED. R. EVID. 609.
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of social perception and cognition show that observers who learn that
an individual has one negative characteristic or trait are apt to generalize and assume that the person has other bad characteristics or
traits.11 Third, the meaning of the evidence might change. Meaning
is constructed taking context into account. Evidence that seems inconclusive against a defendant with no record of wrongdoing may appear to be more damning when jurors learn of the defendant’s
criminal past.12 Thus, the weight and significance of the evidence in a
case may change as a function of knowledge about a defendant’s criminal record. Finally, the threshold for conviction, or the subjective
burden of proof, may differ for defendants with and without criminal
records. Jurors may be willing to convict on less evidence if the defendant has a criminal past. Thus, what constitutes reasonable doubt may
be interpreted more expansively by jurors if the defendant appears to
have no record.
A. Experimental Research with Mock Jurors
Several experimental studies have examined the possible negative
effects of a defendant’s criminal record on jury decision making. Using a mock jury paradigm in which research participants are given
case evidence, the studies divide participants so that some learn about
the defendant’s criminal record while others do not. Or, the type of
criminal record is varied. Comparing responses of these groups of
participants provides insight into the impact of knowledge of a criminal record.
Most of the experimental studies show that knowledge of a defendant’s criminal record has statistically significant biasing effects on jurors’ guilt perceptions and verdicts. British researchers A.P. Sealy and
W.R. Cornish conducted one of the earliest experiments testing the
impact of a defendant’s criminal record.13 At the time, a defendant’s
criminal record was generally inadmissible in British courts.14 Community members listened to a tape recording of a case of either theft
or rape, made individual judgments, and then deliberated to reach a
group verdict.15 The case facts were designed to be ambiguous so that
either verdict could be justified. There were four conditions in the
experiment: a control condition with no information about the defendant’s criminal record; a condition in which a previous record for a
similar offense was disclosed; a condition in which a dissimilar record
11
See Hans & Doob, supra note 9, at 237–38; see also SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E.
TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO CULTURE 95–96 (2d ed. 2008).
12
See Hans & Doob, supra note 9, at 238.
13
L.S.E. Jury Project, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 208.
14
Id. at 211.
15
Id.

R
R
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was disclosed; and a similar-offense condition in which the judge gave
instructions to disregard the record. The researchers found an increase in the proportion of individual mock jurors’ judgments of guilt
when they learned of a defendant’s previous record for crimes similar
to that charged, although the effect declined slightly when they were
told to disregard the record. Introducing a dissimilar conviction did
not bias mock jurors against the defendant; in fact, the proportion
voting guilty declined somewhat compared to the control condition.16
The basic finding of greater convictions if jurors learn of defendants’ previous records for similar crimes has been replicated in subsequent studies.17 In addition, other experimental work has shed light
on the likely mechanisms by which criminal-record information produces a greater likelihood of conviction. Valerie Hans and Anthony
Doob transcribed mock jury deliberations and found that jurors who
knew of a defendant’s record were more apt to begin the deliberation
with pro-prosecution statements, a result that suggests that they were
more confident in their negative assessment of the defendant’s case.18
These juries more often described the evidence as strong and more
frequently brought up damaging evidence during deliberations. In
contrast, juries that did not learn of the defendant’s record were more
likely to discredit the prosecution evidence against the defendant—
for example, by describing problems with eyewitness accounts, biased
police lineups, or the limits of circumstantial evidence. Jurors more
often mentioned how to interpret reasonable doubt in juries that
knew about the defendant’s record. Hans and Doob argue that jurors
interpreted the case evidence itself differently as a result of knowing
16

Id. at 222.
See A.N. Doob & H.M. Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect of s. 12 of the
Canada Evidence Act upon an Accused, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 88, 93–95 (1972) (finding that a similar
record increased convictions and that a limiting instruction had no beneficial effect);
Edith Greene & Mary Dodge, The Influence of Prior Record Evidence on Juror Decision Making,
19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 67, 76 (1995) (finding that mock jurors were more likely to convict
if they learned of a prior conviction, compared to no conviction information or information about a prior acquittal); Hans & Doob, supra note 9, at 251 (finding that deliberating
groups were more likely to convict if they learned of a defendant’s similar criminal record); Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects on Juries of Hearing About the Defendant’s Previous Criminal Record: A Simulation Study, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 734, 753–55 (finding that recent similar
convictions increased the likelihood of conviction and dissimilar convictions showed a
comparative decline); Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
37, 47 (1985) (finding that similar records increased convictions compared to no prior
convictions and that defendants with previous convictions for perjury and dissimilar crimes
were convicted at intermediate rates); see also Eugene Borgida & Roger Park, The Entrapment Defense: Juror Comprehension and Decision Making, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19, 32 (1988)
(finding that prior records increased convictions if entrapment was defined narrowly); Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, The Effects of Impeachment Evidence and Limiting Instructions on
Individual and Group Decision Making, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 477, 488 (1988) (finding that
impeachment evidence influences decision making in legally impermissible ways).
18
Hans & Doob, supra note 9, at 244.
17

R

R
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the defendant’s record.19 In contrast, discussions of the defendant’s
credibility during deliberations did not differ significantly between
the two groups.20
Other researchers have also concluded that determinations of the
defendant’s credibility are not the prime method by which criminal
record influences guilt judgments. For example, in Roselle Wissler
and Michael Saks’s mock juror study, jurors’ ratings of the defendant’s credibility did not differ across their control and record conditions.21 In addition, the researchers conducted an analysis of
covariance that controlled for the potential mediating effect of credibility judgments, yet the significant impact of criminal record on
mock juror verdicts remained.22 In a study by Edith Greene and Mary
Dodge, 17% of mock jurors convicted the accused based on just the
facts, compared to 40% of mock jurors who additionally learned of
the defendant’s prior record.23 Jurors who heard of the criminal record made more negative inferences about the defendant. Mock jurors’ knowledge of the prior record affected their ratings of both the
perceived dangerousness and the credibility of the defendant, in contrast to some other studies. There was no statistically significant difference between record and no-record jurors’ reported threshold for
conviction, that is, the minimum percentage of evidence that they
would need to convict the defendant.24
Finally, Sally Lloyd-Bostock’s British study varied the presence,
similarity, and recency of prior convictions and found that mock jurors who learned of a recent similar conviction rated the probability
that the defendant committed the crime as higher.25 These mock jurors estimated the probability of guilt as 66%, compared to 52% for
those who did not hear of a record. Similar and dissimilar convictions
had different effects. Jurors who heard about a five-year-old conviction for a similar offense rated the defendant’s tendency to commit
this kind of crime as higher compared to the control condition. Credibility judgments did not differ between jurors who learned of similar
records and jurors in the control condition; however, jurors who
learned of a recent dissimilar record said that they were more likely to
believe the defendant than jurors in any of the other conditions.26
19

Id. at 244–47.
Id. at 247.
21
Wissler & Saks, supra note 17, at 41–42 (finding that credibility ratings did not
differ across conditions and that even after controlling for the impact of credibility judgments, prior records had strong effects on verdicts).
22
Id. at 42.
23
Greene & Dodge, supra note 17, at 72–74.
24
Id. at 75.
25
Lloyd-Bostock, supra note 17, at 743–44.
26
Id. at 746–47.
20

R
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The different patterns for similar and dissimilar prior convictions led
Lloyd-Bostock to conclude that jurors primarily used criminal-record
evidence to infer propensity rather than to assess credibility. Further
analyses showed that a previous conviction for indecent assault on a
child created substantial prejudice above and beyond similarity to the
currently charged offense, thus underscoring the point that the nature of a prior record may lead jurors to make inferences about the
character of the defendant as well as the defendant’s likelihood of
having committed the offense.27 Interestingly, 66% of the mock jurors in the control condition, who were given no information about
the defendant’s record, said that they thought that he had at least one
or more prior convictions.28
Thus, prior work indicates that jurors use similar criminal-record
information to develop propensity judgments and other generally
negative evaluations of a defendant. The evidence against a defendant with a prior record appears stronger to the jury. From the limited experimental study of the threshold hypothesis, the threshold for
conviction does not seem to change. Although the defendant’s credibility can be harmed by knowledge of a record, credibility does not
appear to be the main way that criminal record information affects
the guilt judgments of jurors. The experimental research also suggests that limiting instructions are not a reliable method for eliminating the negative impact of criminal records.29
B. Research with Judges
How criminal-record information might affect judicial decision
making is also of interest, and a handful of studies examine this topic.
The studies show similar negative effects caused by knowledge of a
defendant’s criminal record. For instance, one study presented American judges with a scenario of a products liability lawsuit in which the
defendant company conceded liability but disputed the plaintiff’s
damages; the judge’s task was to determine an appropriate damage
award for the plaintiff’s pain and suffering.30 Some judges also had to
rule on the company’s motion to introduce the plaintiff’s fourteenyear-old fraud conviction, while other judges never heard of the plaintiff’s record. The criminal record information led to marginal differ27

Id. at 748–52.
Id. at 753.
29
For an excellent review of the literature, see Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt,
Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures
of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 677 (2000).
30
Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1306–08
(2005).
28
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ences in award amounts. The authors point out that the precise
mechanism by which the criminal record (even if it was suppressed, as
most judges ruled) influenced judges is unknown. For instance, because the past crime was fraud, the judges might have drawn a negative inference about the credibility of testimony in the products
liability case. Or, they may have judged the plaintiff to be an undesirable person and reduced his compensation.31
Lloyd-Bostock replicated part of her jury study with British lay
magistrates.32 The magistrates watched the video depiction of the
trial, completed initial individual questionnaires, and deliberated (as
they do normally) in groups of three to arrive at group verdicts.33
Compared to a defendant with no record, when magistrates evaluated
the same case of a defendant with a record, they rated the defendant’s
guilt as significantly higher. Like the majority of the mock jurors,
69% of the magistrates who learned nothing about a defendant’s
criminal record nonetheless judged him likely to have one.34
Another study had 88 Ohio judges and 104 jurors participate in
parallel experiments testing the effect of limiting instructions and
inadmissible evidence.35 Some of the judges and jurors were provided
with facts that could not legally be considered in deciding the case,
while others, in a control condition, did not hear the objectionable
facts. Half of the judges and jurors who heard the inadmissible evidence received a limiting instruction directing that the evidence
should be set aside, but the others did not receive this instruction.
Both judges and jurors responded similarly. Those who heard the
inadmissible evidence—even if told to disregard the information—responded more negatively, compared to judges and jurors in the control condition.36
One other study deserves mention. Peter Blanck videotaped
judges’ final legal instructions in jury trials.37 In a number of analyses
of the videotapes, evaluators found that the extent of the defendants’
criminal records was correlated with distinctive nonverbal behavior by
judges during the final jury instructions.38 The impact on the jury
31

Id. at 1308.
See Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects on Lay Magistrates of Hearing That the Defendant Is
of “Good Character”, Being Left to Speculate, or Hearing That He Has a Previous Conviction, 2006
CRIM. L. REV. 189.
33
Id. at 194.
34
Id. at 194–95.
35
Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113, 120
(1994).
36
Id. at 122–25.
37
Peter David Blanck et al., The Appearance of Justice: Judges’ Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89 (1985).
38
Id. at 122–23.
32

\\server05\productn\C\CRN\94-6\CRN602.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 11

TAKING A STAND ON TAKING THE STAND

15-SEP-09

13:39

1363

decisions was not clear from this small study, but Blanck argues that
judges’ views may influence juries through both verbal and nonverbal
channels.39
Although there are few judge studies, they tend to converge with
the jury experiments and show similar patterns of more negative assessments and the difficulty of following limiting instructions regarding the use of a criminal record.
C. Prior Research with Real Juries
Complementing the experimental research are a few previous
studies of real juries and the role of criminal records. In Harry Kalven
and Hans Zeisel’s 1950s classic national study of judicial agreement
with jury verdicts in criminal trials, the presence of a criminal record
appeared to be a prime determinant of a defendant’s decision to testify at trial.40 When defendants had no prior record, they testified in
91% of cases; by comparison, defendants who had criminal records
testified in 74% of cases.41 In their sample of criminal trials, 53% of
defendants had criminal records while 47% did not.42 Interestingly,
the link between taking the stand and the jury’s learning of a defendant’s record was not invariant. If a defendant with a record took the
stand, 72% of the time the jury learned about the record; conversely,
if a defendant with a record elected not to testify, 13% of the time the
jury learned of the record anyway.43 Kalven and Zeisel attributed
some disagreement between judge and jury over the verdict to
whether defendants had criminal records and whether they took the
stand.44 Kalven and Zeisel examined a set of cases in which the evidence was closely balanced. In this set of cases, for defendants with
no records who took the stand, juries were more apt to acquit when
judges would have convicted, compared to cases with defendants with
records who did not take the stand.45 But note that this analysis conflates having a criminal record and taking the stand.46
39

Id. at 133.
HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 143–48 (1966).
41
Id. at 146 tbl.43 (basing percentages on 1143 cases from Sample II).
42
Id. at 145 tbl.42 (basing percentages on 1143 cases in Sample II); id. at 145 n.12
(basing percentages on 2385 cases from Sample I).
43
Id. at 147 tbl.44 (basing percentages on 1534 defendants from Samples I and II
who had criminal records).
44
Id. at 179 tbl.56.
45
Id.
46
Kalven and Zeisel did not conduct statistical analyses of these data; rather, they
presented the data in tabular form. See generally id. Recently, Joseph Gastwirth and
Michael Sinclair used statistical techniques to analyze Kalven and Zeisel’s data on the impact of criminal record on judge–jury disagreement in criminal cases. Joseph L. Gastwirth
& Michael D. Sinclair, A Re-Examination of the 1966 Kalven–Zeisel Study of Judge–Jury Agreements and Disagreements and Their Causes, 3 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 169 (2004). They found
that in cases with closely balanced evidence, judge–jury disagreement was related to the
40
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In a study using 201 actual Indiana jury trials, Martha Myers reported a statistically significant association between the number of a
defendant’s prior convictions and the likelihood of conviction. Juries
were more likely to convict defendants who had numerous prior convictions. But it appears that in just 36 of these jury trials, the defendant (or accomplices) provided statements or testimony about
involvement or lack of involvement in the crime.47
Daniel Givelber published an interesting analysis of the NCSC
data that are the subject of this Article. On the basis of his analysis,
Givelber concluded that the jurors’ knowledge of a defendant’s criminal record made little difference in jury verdicts.48 That study did not
account for the defendant’s decision whether to testify. Givelber’s
analysis treated all cases in which the jury did not become aware of a
defendant’s criminal history the same, whether or not the defendant
testified. The effect of defendants’ testimony on their convictions
should be assessed in conjunction with the decision to testify, as the
decision to testify is not a random act. At a minimum, one should
explore the effect of a criminal record in cases in which defendants
testify because these are the cases in which the jury is most apt to learn
about criminal records, if they exist.
Givelber and Amy Farrell, again using the NCSC data, explore
the relation between the case the defense presented and the verdict.
They include having a criminal record as an explanatory factor for
verdict and report that juries are four times more likely to acquit if the
defendant has no prior criminal record.49 Given their research question, their model includes cases in which the defendant had no criminal record, so they do not test the effect of the jury’s learning about a
criminal record conditional on the defendant having a criminal record. The relation between verdict and learning about a criminal record may be confounded in such a model by cases in which the
defendant did not have a criminal record. Acquittals in such cases
may be attributable to the absence of a criminal record or to the jury
not learning about the record, given that one exists, as Givelber and
Farrell note.50
presence of superior defense counsel, a sympathetic defendant, and the defendant’s criminal record. Id. at 174. In clear-evidence cases, a sympathetic defendant and the absence of
a prior record helped the defendant’s case. Id. at 183, 184 tbl.9.
47
Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 781, 786–87 tbl.1, 793 tbl.2 (1979).
48
Daniel Givelber, Lost Innocence: Speculation and Data About the Acquitted, 42 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1167, 1190 (2005).
49
Daniel Givelber & Amy Farrell, Judges and Juries: The Defense Case and Differences in
Acquittal Rates, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 31, 45–47 (2008).
50
Id. at 47. Our results suggest that the effect of criminal record is in one sense
stronger and in another sense weaker than Givelber and Farrell report. In low-evidentiarystrength cases, we find a statistically significant association between learning about criminal
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D. Some Caveats
Several factors might make it difficult to detect effects of criminal
records on real juries, even if defendants’ records influence case outcomes. First is the issue of selection bias.51 Some of the impact of
criminal record may occur at early stages of case processing. Undoubtedly criminal record plays a role in who is initially investigated
by police, who is targeted for prosecution, and who receives a
favorable plea agreement prior to trial. Thus, in comparing cases in
which defendants do or do not have past criminal records, one may
reasonably assume that these defendants and their cases may differ in
a variety of ways in addition to their criminal pasts.
Similarly, a defendant’s criminal record may affect the decision
to take the stand—a focus of this Article. The evidence and other
factors in cases with and without defendant testimony are apt to differ
in myriad ways because only cases with such testimony directly raise
issues of credibility. Thus, it is challenging to separate the effects of
the defendant’s criminal record and the effects of the defendant’s
testimony.
Furthermore, the type of criminal record should influence the
decision to testify and other behavior. For example, the prior crimes
among defendants who testify are apt to be more minor, or at least
less probative of guilt, than among defendants who do not take the
stand. Judges may be especially concerned about the prejudicial effects of similar crime records. Yet prosecutors might try harder to get
the prior conviction into evidence if the crime is especially probative.
Because we lack information about the nature of defendants’ prior
crimes, we cannot control for the influence that the nature of the
crime has on the decision to testify or on the jurors’ decision to convict or acquit.
Setting aside selection effects, another factor limiting the ability
to isolate the effect of a criminal record is conflating the criminal record with the perceived strength of evidence. As discussed above, jurors who learn that a defendant has a criminal record may
history and case outcome. In high-evidentiary-strength cases, we find no significant association between learning about criminal history and case outcome. See infra tbl.9. For
Givelber and Farrell’s concern about using the NCSC evidentiary-strength variables, see
Givelber & Farrell, supra note 49, at 39 n.6.
51
Cf. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending
Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124 (1992) (exploring the potentially confounding impact
of selection effects in comparing judge and jury trial outcomes). As Kevin Clermont and
Theodore Eisenberg describe, because parties may choose a judge or a jury trial, cases
heard by judges and juries may differ along multiple dimensions, making it difficult to
attribute the cause of outcome differences to the fact finder alone. Likewise, because police and prosecutors may consider defendants’ criminal records in deciding whether to
investigate, arrest, and prosecute, the cases of defendants who do and do not have criminal
records may differ along multiple dimensions. See id. at 1128–33.

R
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incorporate that information into their narrative account of the evidence in the case, seeing the case as having stronger evidence favoring conviction. The evidentiary-strength variables would contain most
of the information embodied in the knowledge of criminal history variable. If one uses judgments of evidence strength to control for the
closeness of the case, as we do here, a defendant’s criminal history
might not emerge as a statistically significant independent factor, even
if it had an effect.
Notwithstanding these caveats, the data analyzed here have a special strength worth noting. Prior studies try to assess the overall
strength of the evidence by indirect measures. Thus, to assess evidentiary strength, researchers have relied on the presence of classes of
evidence such as eyewitness identification testimony, expert testimony, or physical evidence.52 But the existence of a class of evidence
does not necessarily affect case outcomes. For example, a jury can
view expert testimony as strongly implicating a defendant or as having
little probative value. Proxies for evidentiary strength cannot capture
the jurors’ overall assessments of the quality of the case. As described
below, this study contains a quantitative measure of the jurors’ overall
estimates of the strength of the evidence against the defendants. We
thus have a reasonable control for evidentiary strength that allows us
to test the contribution of criminal record to case outcome.
II
DATA DESCRIPTION
The NCSC gathered the data used in this study as part of a NIJfunded project to study hung juries. The NCSC’s report, Are Hung
Juries a Problem?,53 thoroughly describes the data, so the description
here, derived from the NCSC report, is more abbreviated. The data
have also been used in several other studies.54
52

See, e.g., Myers, supra note 47, at 786 tbl.1.
See Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Mott & G. Thomas Munsterman, Are Hung Juries a Problem? 29–40 (2002), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/
WC/Publications/Res_Juries_HungJuriesProblemPub.pdf.
54
The description of research methodology in this Article is drawn from the study
description in Theodore Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L.
Waters, G. Thomas Munsterman, Stewart J. Schwab & Martin T. Wells, Judge–Jury Agreement
in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171 (2005). Other studies using these data include Stephen P. Garvey,
Paula Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Mott, G. Thomas Munsterman & Martin
T. Wells, Juror First Votes in Criminal Trials, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 371 (2004); Givelber,
supra note 48; Givelber & Farrell, supra note 49; Valerie P. Hans, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor,
Nicole L. Mott & G. Thomas Munsterman, The Hung Jury: The American Jury’s Insights and
Contemporary Understanding, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 33 (2003); Michael Heise, Criminal Case Complexity: An Empirical Perspective, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 331 (2004); Spencer, supra note
8.

R

53
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Four sites participated in the data collection: The Central Division, Criminal, of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, California;
the Maricopa County Superior Court (Phoenix), Arizona; the Bronx
County Supreme Court, New York; and the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Several criteria shaped site selection. First, each
site needed a sufficiently high volume of felony jury trials to permit
data collection within a reasonable time period. Second, court personnel had to be willing to cooperate in data collection, including
agreeing to adhere to privacy and confidentiality protocols. Los Angeles and Washington, D.C., were included because of reported concerns about hung jury rates. Maricopa was chosen to study the effects
of an innovative procedure allowing judges to admit further evidence
and arguments in cases with deadlocked juries. The New York State
Office of Court Administration provided suggestions about high-volume courts in New York City and helped secure the Bronx County
Supreme Court’s cooperation.
After a pretest in Los Angeles,55 data were collected at the four
sites. Data were collected in Los Angeles from June, 2000, through
October, 2000.56 Maricopa County began data collection in November of 2000 and ended in October, 2001.57 Data from the Bronx were
collected from February through August, 2001, and data for Washington, D.C. were collected from April through August, 2001.
Court personnel at the sites distributed and collected questionnaire packets covering noncapital felony cases in all site courtrooms.
The sample excludes misdemeanor cases because hung juries in felony trials are typically of greater concern to policymakers. The sample excludes capital cases because of the sanction’s severity and
because of the risk that confidential juror questionnaire data might be
used in litigation. Further information about the data collection is
available in NCSC’s report.58
The Questionnaires. Each packet contained instructions and questionnaires for the judges, attorneys, and jurors. Each packet also had
a case data form requesting information about case characteristics and
outcomes. Many of the questions asked trial participants to give ratings on a seven-point Likert scale. The content of each questionnaire
55

Hannaford-Agor, Hans, Mott & Munsterman, supra note 53, at 29.
This period overlapped with a significant local investigation of the Los Angeles
police (the Ramparts investigation), producing some concern about the typicality of the
conviction/acquittal ratio. Id.
57
A brief hiatus during this period was the result of some confusion on which cases
were to be included in the study. For a short time, some judges believed that data were to
be collected only if the jury hung. Thus, the number of hung juries in Maricopa County
may be elevated. Id. The hung jury rates in Maricopa were 3.3% (hung on all counts),
5.1% (hung on count one), and 7.7% (hung on any count). Id. at 41 tbl.4.1.
58
See id. at 29–31.
56

R
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most relevant to this study is listed below and is described more fully
in the NCSC report.59
• Case Data Form—type of charge, sentence range, jury’s decision,
and demographic information about the defendant(s) and the victim(s), voir dire, trial evidence and procedures, and jury deliberations. This form included a specific question about whether the
defendant had a criminal record and whether the jury learned of
that record.
• Judge Questionnaire—(Part I—before jury verdict) verdict judge
would have reached in bench trial, evaluation of the evidence, case
complexity, attorney skill, and likelihood that the jury would hang;
(Part II—after jury verdict) reaction to the verdict and experience
on the bench.
• Juror Questionnaire—case complexity, attorney skill, evaluation of
the evidence, rating of the believability of the defendant as a witness, rating of sympathy for the defendant, formation of opinion,
dynamics of the deliberations including the first and final votes, juror participation, conflict, reaction to verdict, opinion about applicable law, assessment of criminal justice in the community, and
demographic information.

Distribution of Study Packages. Researchers briefed judges and key
court personnel about the project and instructed them about how the
packet distribution was to occur.60 Packets were sent from the jury
assembly room to the courtrooms with the panel for voir dire. Once
the jury was selected, court personnel distributed the packets to the
judge and/or court clerk. If the case proceeded through to jury deliberations and did not end by a plea agreement, dismissal, or mistrial
for some reason other than the jury’s inability to arrive at a unanimous verdict, the judge was asked to complete the judge survey. In
addition, either the clerk or the judge was to complete a questionnaire about general case information on a case data form.
Once the jury retired to deliberate, court personnel distributed
the questionnaire to the judges. The judges were asked to complete
the questionnaires in two stages, answering some questions prior to
the jury decision (Part I) and the remaining questions after the jury
rendered its verdict or the case was declared a mistrial (Part II). The
court personnel distributed the final set of questionnaires to the jurors after the verdict was announced or a mistrial declared. To protect confidentiality, respondents were provided blank envelopes for
completed questionnaires. Court staff collected the completed ques59
Id. at 30 app. A. The contents of the Attorney Questionnaire are not included here
because the current analysis does not include items from attorneys.
60
For the time sequence of the packet distribution, see id. at 31 fig.3.1.
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tionnaires and gave these to the designated court liaison for each site,
who forwarded the cases to the NCSC for data entry and analysis.
Response Rates. The NCSC report summarizes response rates.61
Briefly, case data forms were returned in 358 of the 401 cases, an 89%
response rate. Judges completed 366 questionnaires (91% response
rate). Although confidentiality precludes us from linking the data in
a particular case to an individual judge, we are confident that a substantial number of judges are represented in the sample. For example, in Maricopa County, twenty-nine judges sat in the criminal
division in fiscal year 2000–2001.62
Overall, 3626 jurors returned their questionnaires. The response
rate for jurors across all sites, with consideration for jury size, was 80%.
For the twelve-person juries in Los Angeles, Maricopa, the Bronx, and
D.C., the average response rate was eleven, ten, eight, and ten jurors,
respectively.63 For the eight-person juries in Maricopa,64 an average
of seven jurors responded. The Case Data Form surveys asked factual
information about the criminal charges filed and the jury’s decision65
and led to 382 usable cases, though particular analyses reported below
have fewer observations due to data missing on variables under consideration. The number of questionnaires included in the final usable
database varied slightly for each site and is summarized in the NCSC
report.66
III
DEFENDANT TESTIMONY AND JURIES’ LEARNING
CRIMINAL RECORD

OF

Preliminarily, the judges’ descriptions of the importance of defendant testimony confirm that defendant testimony plays a promi61

See id. at 32–33.
E-mail from Judge G.T. Anagnost to Theodore Eisenberg (Jan. 26, 2004) (on file
with author). For a race and gender breakdown of the judges, see Eisenberg, HannafordAgor, Hans, Waters, Munsterman, Schwab & Wells, supra note 54, at 205 n.61.
63
In California, New York, and D.C., twelve-person juries try felony cases. See CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 16; N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 18; D.C. CODE § 16-705 (2006).
64
Arizona law provides for eight-person juries in felony trials unless the penalty for
the defendant includes death or a potential sentence of thirty years or more, in which case
there are twelve jurors. See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 23. In Maricopa County, there were
thirty cases with twelve-member juries and sixty-nine juries with eight members. Six cases
had too little information to determine jury size. Hannaford-Agor, Hans, Mott & Munsterman, supra note 53, at 30.
65
If this key information was missing from the questionnaires, NCSC made follow-up
inquiries with the courts. NCSC salvaged thirty-one cases without Case Data Forms
through direct communication with the courts to obtain the key information about the
cases. The courts were unable to recover this missing information in twelve cases, which
were not included in the final data analysis. Seven additional cases had so little information (three or fewer questionnaires received) that they were also eliminated from the analysis. Id.
66
Id. at 33 tbl.3.1.
62

R
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nent role at trial.67 In the cases in which defendants testified, judges
reported that, on average, defendant testimony was more important
than that of the police, of informants, of co-defendants, and of expert
witnesses. Only victim testimony received a higher mean score on the
Likert one-to-seven scale, and even this difference was only marginally
statistically significant (p = 0.075, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed-rank
test). Judges viewed defendant testimony as significantly more important than police testimony (p < 0.001), informant testimony
(p < 0.001), codefendant testimony (p = 0.003), and expert-witness
testimony (p < 0.001). Defendant testimony was not significantly
more important than eyewitness testimony (p = 0.597).
Defendants’ testifying presumably directly affects whether jurors
learn of a defendant’s prior criminal record, if any. So we first determine whether defendants testified and then assess whether such testimony is associated with juries’ learning about past convictions. We
explore in Parts III.A and III.B the relation between individual factors
and the decision to testify and juries’ learning about criminal history.
Part III.C assesses these factors in regression models.
A. Defendant Testimony: Case Characteristics Considered
Separately
Because defendant testimony is important, it is reasonable to explore the factors that might be expected to influence a defendant’s
decision to testify. Given the threat of impeachment with a prior conviction, the most obvious hypothesis is that defendants are more reluctant to testify if they have a prior criminal record than if they do not.
One way or another, they may worry, the prosecution will be able to
use the record in cross-examination, thereby disadvantaging the
defendant.
However, in addition to whether the defendant has a prior criminal record, other factors such as evidentiary strength, race, sex, and
type of crime should also be considered. In the fairly unusual case
when defense counsel believes conviction is highly unlikely even without a defendant denial, the risk of testifying may not be worth the
possible benefit. So the overall perceived strength of the evidence
might be associated with the decision to testify.
Additionally, personal background variables, especially race and
sex, might be associated with the decision to testify. At the aggregate
level, minorities and whites have different perceptions about the criminal justice system,68 and these perceptions might lead to different
rates of testifying. Men and women might react differently to the
67

See id. at 50, 51 tbl.4.7.
See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, Forecasting Life
and Death: Juror Race, Religion, and Attitude Toward the Death Penalty, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 277,
68
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prospect of a public appearance on the witness stand or to other influences. Perception of the defendant’s general appeal as a witness will
influence the decision to testify, as it would for any other witness.
The nature of the crime charged could also be relevant. The trial
judge must weigh the potential prejudice to the defendant of a prior
conviction coming into evidence. That balancing process may differ
depending on the type of crime at trial.
Table 1 shows the relation between the first four factors and
whether the defendant testified at trial.
TABLE 1. DEFENDANT TESTIMONY
PANEL A. DEFENDANT CHARACTERISTIC,

AND

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS

DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES

Number not testifying Number testifying
Defendant: had prior record
had no prior record
Defendant: was minority
was white
Defendant: was male
was female
PANEL B. CASE CHARACTERISTIC,

% testifying

137

114

30

49

45.4
62.0*

145

130

47.3
63.6†

12

21

147

138

48.4

9

20

69.0*

CONTINUOUS VARIABLES

Mean of those not
testifying

Mean of those
testifying

Evidence strength—judges’ view

4.88

4.72

51.5 (N=346)

Evidence strength—jurors’ view

4.62

4.38

49.8 (N=3142)

Note: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001; 163 of 330 defendants (49.4%)
testified. The third numerical column reports the significance level of difference between those
with and without a characteristic. For significance levels, † indicates p < 0.10, * indicates p <
0.05. Significance levels at the case level account for stratification of sample by site. Significance
levels at the juror level (“Evidence strength—jurors’ view”) account for both site stratification
and the non-independence of observations at the case level. The minority-white comparison
treats blacks and Hispanics as minorities and excludes two Asians and fifteen defendants
classified as being of “other” races. Strength of evidence in Panel B is coded on a one-to-seven
Likert scale, with higher values indicating evidence more favorable to the prosecution.

Panel A first shows the association between the existence of a
prior criminal record and whether the defendant testified at trial. In
251 of 330 cases with information available about prior records and
whether the defendant testified, the defendants had criminal records.
Forty-five percent of defendants with prior records testified, compared
to 62% of defendants without known prior records. The difference in
the proportion of defendants with and without criminal records who
testify is statistically significant (p = 0.011).

284–85 nn.33, 35–36 (2001) (citing sources about racial differences in attitude toward the
death penalty); id. at 298 n.80 (citing sources about juror race and decision making).
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Panel A also shows that minorities, used here to include blacks
and Hispanics, comprise the bulk of defendants in the studied sites.69
The four sites studied all have substantial minority populations. Only
33 cases involved white defendants, compared to 275 with minority
defendants. Although over 60% of white defendants testified, less
than half of minority defendants testified. This result is marginally
statistically significant.
This result, however, could be the product of confounding due to
races having different rates of prior criminal records. Minority defendants were more likely to have criminal histories than white defendants were. Of 275 minority defendants, 215 (71.2%) had prior
records. Of 33 white defendants, 18 (54.6%) had criminal records.
This difference is statistically significant at p = 0.005. Table 2, therefore, shows the percentage of defendants who testified, controlling for
minority status and prior criminal record. Two-thirds of white defendants without prior criminal records testified, compared to a slightly
lower 62% of minority defendants. The big difference in rate of testimony is between whites who had criminal records and minorities who
had criminal records. About 6 in 10 whites with criminal records testified, compared to about 4 in 10 minorities with criminal records.
Panel A of Table 1 also shows gender differences in the relation
between having a prior record and testifying. About 48% of males
testified, compared to 69% of females. This difference is statistically
significant (p = 0.036) despite the few women defendants. Panel B of
Table 1 indicates that there are no significant differences in the
strength of evidence between cases of defendants who did or did not
testify. This is so whether one uses the judge’s or the jury’s view of
evidentiary strength.
Table 3 reports the relation among the type of criminal case, the
existence of a prior record, and the decision to testify. It shows substantial variation in the rate of testimony by type of case, both for defendants with and without criminal records. For defendants without
criminal records, the rate of testifying ranged from over 93% in assault cases to just over 14% in second-degree murder cases. For defendants with criminal records, testifying rates ranged from 14% in
attempted murder cases to about 57% in assault cases to over 70% in
the residual category of “Other” case types. In addition, rates varied
within case type depending on whether the defendant had a prior
record. For the largest case type in which defendants did not have
criminal records, assault, the 93% testimony rate for defendants without criminal records is accompanied by a 57% rate for defendants
69
The analysis excludes two cases with Asian defendants and fifteen cases with defendant race designated as “other.” Cases with insufficient information about race are likewise
excluded.
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TABLE 2. RACE, PRIOR RECORD,

AND

RATES

Defendant had
no prior record

OF

13:39

TESTIFYING

Defendant had
prior record

Total

WHITE DEFENDANT
Testimony rate (%)

66.7

61.1

63.6

Number of cases

15

18

33

MINORITY DEFENDANT
Testimony rate (%)

61.7

43.3

47.3

Number of cases

60

215

275

Testimony rate (%)

62.7

44.6

49.0

Number of cases

75

233

308

TOTAL

Note: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001.

with criminal records (p = 0.024, Fisher’s exact test). A similar large
difference exists for first-degree murder cases (p = 0.056, Fisher’s exact test).
B. Juries’ Learning About Prior Criminal Records: Case
Characteristics Considered Separately
Testifying is risky for defendants with prior criminal records because the records may be revealed on cross-examination. To assess
whether juries learn of criminal records, we limit the sample to those
cases in which the defendant had a prior record. Using this reduced
sample, Table 4 shows the relation among defendant characteristics,
evidentiary strength, and whether the jury learned about the defendant’s criminal record.
Panel A first shows the association between whether the defendant testified and the jury’s learning of the prior record. Note that by
far the most frequent pattern, accounting for about half the cases, was
for the defendant not to testify and for the jury not to learn about the
prior record. Interesting variation nevertheless emerges. Panel A
shows a statistically significant association (p < 0.001) between defendants’ testifying and juries’ learning about the records. About 52% of
juries learned of a defendant’s record if the defendant testified. In
contrast, juries learned about criminal record if defendants did not
testify in less than 9% of cases, a low rate, similar to that reported by
Kalven and Zeisel.70 Because only about half the juries with testifying
defendants learned of criminal records, the results suggest that
judges, as evidentiary rules require, balance the relevance of a prior
criminal record with the possible prejudice to the defendant.
70
See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 40, at 147 (reporting that juries learn of records in
13% of the cases in which defendants do not testify).

R
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TABLE 3. PERCENT OF CASES IN WHICH DEFENDANT TESTIFIED,
TYPE AND EXISTENCE OF PRIOR RECORD
Case type
Assault (not sexual)
Attempted murder
Burglary
DUI/DWI
Illegal drug possession
Illegal drug sale
Larceny/theft
Murder, first-degree
Murder, second-degree
Rape, other sex crimes
Robbery
Weapons
Other
Total

No prior record

13:39

Prior record

BY

CASE

Total

15

21

36

(93.3)

(57.1)

(72.2)

4

7

11

(25.0)

(14.3)

(18.2)

4

10

14

(50.0)

(60.0)

(57.1)

5

7

12

(40.0)

(42.9)

(41.7)

2

24

26

(50.0)

(50.0)

(50.0)

20

46

66

(50.0)

(45.7)

(47.0)

5

11

16

(40.0)

(45.5)

(43.8)

6

23

29

(66.7)

(21.7)

(31.0)

7

6

13

(14.3)

(16.7)

(15.4)

11

7

18

(63.6)

(57.1)

(61.1)

5

38

43

(40.0)

(44.7)

(44.2)

6

13

19

(66.7)

(38.5)

(47.4)

5

10

15

(60.0)

(70.0)

(68.0)

95

233

328

(55.8)

(45.5)

(48.5)

Note: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001. Cells show counts with percents of
cases with the relevant characteristic in which defendant testified in parentheses.

Juries in minority defendants’ cases were more likely to learn of
criminal histories than were juries in white defendants’ cases. Of 226
minority defendants with criminal records, sixty-six (29.2%) had juries
who learned of their criminal records. Of nineteen white defendants
with criminal records, three (15.8%) had juries who learned of their
records. But this difference does not reach traditional levels of statistical significance (p = 0.291), and more observations, especially of white
defendants, are needed to support conclusions.
Panel A also suggests gender differences in the rate at which juries learned of criminal records. Juries learned of criminal records for
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TABLE 4. DEFENDANT TESTIMONY AND JURY KNOWLEDGE
CRIMINAL RECORD

PANEL A. DEFENDANT CHARACTERISTIC,

did not testify
Defendant: was minority
was white
Defendant: was male
was female
PANEL B. CASE CHARACTERISTIC,

OF

DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES

Jury did not learn of
criminal record (N)
Defendant: testified

13:39

Jury learned of
criminal record (N)

% learning of
criminal record

55

59

125

12

51.8

160

66

29.2

16

3

15.8

162

71

30.5

16

2

11.1†

8.8***

CONTINUOUS VARIABLES

Mean of cases, jury
did not learn of
criminal record

Mean of cases, jury
did learn of
criminal record

Evidence strength—
judges’ view

4.94

4.76

28.9 (N=235)

Evidence strength—jurors’
view

4.75

4.53

28.1 (N=2299)

Note: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001. Cells show counts. Sample is limited
to cases in which defendant had a prior criminal record. For significance levels, † indicates p
<0.10; *** indicates p <0.001. Significance levels at the case level account for stratification of
sample by site. Significance levels at the juror level account for both site stratification and the
non-independence of observations at the case level. The minority-white comparison treats
blacks and Hispanics as minorities and excludes two Asians and fifteen defendants classified as
being of “other” races. Strength of evidence in Panel B is coded on a one-to-seven Likert scale,
with higher values indicating evidence more favorable to the prosecution.

about 30% of male defendants, compared to 11% for female defendants. This difference is marginally significant at p = 0.107, with the
low number of female defendants this time being an issue.
Differences in juries’ learning about criminal records are not significantly associated with the overall strength of the case. This is so
whether one uses the judges’ or the juries’ views of evidentiary
strength.
Table 5 reports the relation between the type of criminal case
and whether the jury learned of a criminal record. The sample is
again limited to cases in which the defendant had a criminal record.
Although the overall significance of the table is merely p = 0.121 and
the numbers are small for most case types, the most striking result is
that jurors learned of criminal records in 71% (five of seven)
rape–sexual battery cases. Only one other case type, burglary, had
even a 50% rate.
The noticeably higher rate in sex cases likely is due at least in part
to special evidentiary rules applicable to such cases. California’s general prohibition on admissibility of character evidence71 does not ap71

See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a) (West 2007).
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TABLE 5. JURY LEARNING
BY

13:39

DEFENDANT’S CRIMINAL RECORD
TYPE OF CASE

OF A

Jury did not learn of
criminal record

Jury learned of
criminal record

Total

Case type
Assault (not sexual)
Attempted murder
Burglary
DUI/DWI
Illegal drug possession
Illegal drug sale
Larceny/theft
Murder, first-degree
Murder, second-degree
Rape, other sex crimes
Robbery
Weapons
Other
Total

16

6

22

(72.7)

(27.3)

(100)

7

1

8

(87.5)

(12.5)

(100)

5

6

11

(45.5)

(54.6)

100

7

0

7

(100.0)

(0.0)

(100)

17

7

24

(70.8)

(29.2)

(100)

33

16

49

(67.4)

(32.7)

(100)

7

4

11

(63.6)

(36.4)

(100)

22

3

25

(88.0)

(12.0)

(100)

6

3

9

(66.7)

(33.3)

(100)

2

5

7

(28.6)

(71.4)

(100)

26

12

38

(68.4)

(31.6)

(100)

10

3

13

(76.9)

(23.1)

(100)

15

5

20

(75.0)

(25.0)

(100)

173

71

244

(70.9)

(29.1)

(100)

Note: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001. Cases limited to defendants with
criminal records. Cells show counts with percents of cases with the relevant characteristic in
which jury learned or did not learn of criminal record in parentheses.

ply to the admissibility of prior sexual crimes in cases involving sexual
offenses.72 Arizona loosens restrictions on character evidence in sexual misconduct cases.73 The District of Columbia follows a rule that
“allows proof of a defendant’s past sexual misconduct, similar to the
sexual misconduct for which he is being tried, in order to show that

72
73

See id. § 1108(a).
See ARIZ. R. EVID. 404(c).
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he has an ‘unusual sexual preference.’”74 Similar legislation has been
proposed in the New York State Assembly,75 but the absence of special
prior-sexual-offense legislation does not necessarily preclude impeachment of New York defendants with prior sexual offenses.76
C. Modeling Influences on the Decision to Testify and Juries’
Learning About Prior Criminal Records
With respect to defendants’ testifying, considering variables in
isolation from one another, we find that the existence of a prior criminal record, case type, race, and gender are associated with the decision to testify. This section combines these factors in models of the
decision to testify. With respect to juries’ learning of a defendant’s
criminal record, defendants’ testifying is the strongest influence, but
the other factors considered have notable, albeit not statistically significant, differences. This section considers the factors explored simultaneously in regression models.
Table 6 reports regression models of the decision to testify that
combine the factors explored in subpart A. Model (1) does not account for type of case. Model (2) uses dummy variables to account for
type of case. A test of the hypothesis that the coefficients for these
variables are collectively equal to zero yields p = 0.148, though some
case types are individually significant. Both models account for the
sample stratification by site.77 Of the factors explored in modeling
the decision to testify—the existence of a prior criminal record, race,
sex, strength of the evidence, and case type—only prior record and
case type (not shown separately) are statistically significantly associated, or marginally significantly associated, with the decision to testify.
The models explain the data substantially better than a simple model
of testifying that would be correct in 51% of the cases based on the
simple frequencies in Table 2. Similar models, using site fixed effects,
do not materially differ from those reported here.
It is possible that a defendant’s testifying is associated with the
overall closeness of the case and that the closeness of the case is simultaneously associated with whether a defendant testified. Defense
74
Johnson v. United States, 610 A.2d 729, 730 (D.C. 1992) (quoting Pounds v. United
States, 529 A.2d 791, 793–94 (D.C. 1987)).
75
See 2007 N.Y. Assem. Bill 6744, 230th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., §§ 16, 17 (N.Y. 2007).
76
See People v. Williams, 806 N.Y.S.2d 266, 268 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (allowing crossexamination in a rape case regarding the existence and underlying facts of prior sex-related convictions); see also FED. R. EVID. 413(a) (stating that evidence of other sexual assault
offenses “may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant”).
77
We have also explored, but do not report, multilevel models, see, for example,
ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS 301–21 (2007), to account for locale and type of case. The results do
not materially differ from those reported here.
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TO

TESTIFY
(2)

Dependent variable = defendant testified
(0=no, 1=yes)
−0.541†

−0.663*

(1.89)

(2.02)

Minority defendant

−0.474
(1.17)

−0.478
(0.88)

Male defendant

−0.718

−0.438

(1.64)

(0.95)

−0.101

−0.063

(1.19)

(0.67)

Defendant had prior record

Evidentiary strength
Constant

1.919**
(2.83)

Observations
Case types treatment
Correctly classified
Goodness of fit p-value

0.888
(0.91)

295

279

not accounted for

fixed effects

59.0%

60.6%

0.962

0.434

Note: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001. Table reports coefficients
with t-statistics in parentheses; † indicates p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Goodnessof-fit p-value based on Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic with 10 groups.

counsel may be influenced to have clients testify depending on the
strength of the evidence. But the judge and jury may react to the
evidence in part on the basis of whether the defendant testified. We
therefore explored separate models of not only whether a defendant
testifying is associated with the strength of the evidence as reported by
juries, but also whether the strength of the evidence, as reported by
judges, is associated with whether a defendant testified. We found no
significant association in either relation.
Table 7 reports regression models of the jury’s learning about a
defendant’s prior criminal record. Model (1) does not account for
type of case. Model (2) uses dummy variables to account for type of
case. A test of the hypothesis that they are collectively equal to zero
yields p = 0.228, though some case types are individually significant.
Both models account for the sample stratification by site.78
The models again show a consistent pattern of only one factor
having a substantial, statistically significant effect. A defendant’s testifying is the only factor substantially and significantly contributing to
whether the jury learned of the defendant’s prior criminal record.

78
We also explored, but do not report, multilevel models to account for locale and
type of case. The results do not materially differ from those reported here. See id.
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Similar models, using site-level fixed effects, do not materially differ
from those reported here.
TABLE 7. LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS OF JURY LEARNING
CRIMINAL RECORD
(1)

OF

(2)

Dependent variable = jury learned of
criminal record (0=no, 1=yes)
Defendant testified

2.421**

Minority defendant
Male defendant

2.806**

(6.36)

(6.23)

0.814

1.069

(1.18)

(1.19)

1.287

0.942

(1.55)

(1.04)

Evidentiary strength

−0.133

−0.169

(1.04)

(1.16)

Constant

−3.747**

−4.788**

(3.55)

(3.10)

Observations
Case types treatment
Correctly classified
Goodness of fit p-value

223

210

not accounted for

fixed effects

74.9%

79.1%

0.554

0.679

Note: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001. Table reports coefficients
with t-statistics in parentheses; ** indicates p < 0.01. Goodness-of-fit p-value based on
Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic with 10 groups.

THE EFFECT

OF

IV
JURIES’ LEARNING

OF

CRIMINAL RECORDS

Defendants presumably testify when they believe it promotes acquittal more than not testifying would. As shown in Part III, the decision whether to testify is significantly associated with the existence of a
prior record. And the jury’s learning of a defendant’s prior record is
significantly associated with whether that defendant testified. Table 4
shows that juries rarely learn of criminal records unless defendants
testify. We now explore whether, for the cases of defendants with
criminal records, juries’ learning about criminal records is associated
with whether they convict defendants.
Prior models of conviction using the data analyzed here found
that the perceived strength of the evidence was the only consistent
factor significantly associated with the probability of conviction,79 but
79
Eisenberg, Hannaford-Agor, Hans, Waters, Munsterman, Schwab & Wells, supra
note 54, at 197 tbl. 9.

R
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those models did not include whether juries learned about criminal
records. One study using these data reports no relation between
learning of a criminal record and conviction.80 However, that study
did not control for evidentiary strength.
Studies of jury behavior indicate that the strength of the evidence
dominates decision making. Evidence strength is so powerful that it is
difficult to study the influence of other factors.81 Indeed, Kalven and
Zeisel determined that many factors affected jury decision making
and caused juries to disagree with what the judge would have decided
primarily in cases in which the evidence was closely divided. Jury researchers typically calibrate the evidence in their mock jury experiments so that the evidence is ambiguous and the independent
variables have a chance to influence the verdict.
In our study of real juries, because jurors were asked about the
strength of evidence, we can control for case strength using that measure. The question is whether juries’ learning about criminal records
influences conviction rates after accounting for their views of evidentiary strength.
A. Evidentiary Strength, Conviction Rate, and Knowledge of
Record
Table 8 shows the relation between the jury’s learning of a criminal record and conviction. As noted above, the sample is limited to
cases with defendants who had prior criminal records. For defendants
who testified, there was no meaningful difference in the overall conviction rate between cases in which juries learned of the criminal record and cases in which they did not. Similarly, for defendants who
did not testify, no meaningful difference emerged between defendants with and without records. In addition, convictions rates did not
noticeably differ between defendants who testified and those who did
not. All four conviction rates were between 71% and 78%.
80

See Givelber, supra note 48, at 1190.
See, e.g., JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 102 (1988) (“Juries are evidenceoriented . . . .”); SALLY LLOYD-BOSTOCK, LAW IN PRACTICE: APPLICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY TO
LEGAL DECISION MAKING AND LEGAL SKILLS 48 (1989) (“[T]he most important aspect of any
case with very few exceptions tends to be the strength of the evidence.”); MICHAEL J. SAKS &
REID HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 68 (Robert E. Krieger Publ’g Co. 1986) (1978)
(“[T]he power of evidence is so well recognized by jury researchers that when studying
processes other than evidence, they must calibrate the evidence to be moderate so that it
leaves some variance to be influenced by the variables under study.”); Valerie P. Hans, The
Jury’s Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 194
(1989) (“Typically the evidence . . . drives juror decisionmaking.”); Christy A. Visher, Juror
Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 13–14 (1987) (emphasizing the importance of evidence in comparison to extralegal factors). But see Eisenberg,
Hannaford-Agor, Hans, Waters, Munsterman, Schwab & Wells, supra note 54, at 205 n.60
(finding juror characteristics associated with capital sentencing).

R

81

R
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Of course, the strength of the evidence against a defendant may
confound the seemingly equivalent conviction rates and mask real differences. If evidence against a defendant is noticeably weaker in cases
in which juries learned of convictions, knowledge of prior records may
serve to bolster marginal evidence. Table 8, therefore, also includes
information about the strength of the evidence for each case category.
The measure of evidentiary strength is based on jurors’ reports. Using
judges’ reports about evidentiary strength (not reported here) does
not materially change the results.
TABLE 8. JURY KNOWLEDGE OF PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD
AND CONVICTION
Number not convicted

Number convicted

% convicted

(Evidence strength)

(Evidence strength)

(Evidence strength)

DEFENDANT TESTIFIED
Jury did not learn of record
Mean evidence strength
Jury learned of record
Mean evidence strength

11

36

76.6

(3.10)

(5.40)

(4.86)

12

42

77.8

(2.79)

(4.96)

(4.48)

DEFENDANT DID NOT TESTIFY
Jury did not learn of record
Mean evidence strength
Jury learned of record
Mean evidence strength

32

80

71.4

(3.09)

(5.30)

(4.67)

3

8

72.7

(2.53)

(5.30)

(4.54)

Note: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001. Sample is limited to cases with defendants who had
criminal records. Strength of evidence is coded on a one-to-seven Likert scale with higher values indicating
evidence more favorable to the prosecution.

As expected, substantial differences exist in perceived evidentiary
strength between cases with convictions and acquittals. Evidentiary
strength is naturally the most powerful factor explaining case outcomes. On the one-to-seven scale, evidentiary strength in cases with
convictions clustered around five. Evidentiary strength in acquittals
clustered around three. The question of interest here is whether juror knowledge of criminal records contributes to explaining those
outcomes beyond the explanatory power of the evidentiary strength.
Figure 1 helps assess the influence of knowledge of a criminal
record while accounting for evidentiary strength. The jurors’ view of
the evidence is averaged for each case and rounded to the nearest
integer from one to seven. Thus, each case is assigned an evidentiary
strength of one through seven. The conviction rate is computed at
each of the integer values. The cases with the strongest perceived evidence values, six or seven, had nearly 100% conviction rates whether
or not juries learned about criminal records.
Conviction rates for rounded evidentiary strength values less than
four, below the middle of the Likert scale, show interesting variety.
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.2

Proportion convicted
.4
.6
.8

1

FIGURE 1. CONVICTION RATE AS FUNCTION OF:
EVIDENTIARY STRENGTH & KNOWLEDGE OF RECORD

1

2

3
4
5
Strength of evidence (larger # = stronger)

Jury did not know about record

6

7

Jury knew about record

Note: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001. Evidentiary strength on the xaxis is rounded to the nearest integer value of the mean strength in a case as reported by
multiple jurors. Conviction rates, reported on the y-axis, are computed separately for cases
in which jurors did and did not learn of prior records and are computed separately for
each value on the x-axis. Symbol sizes are proportionate to the number of cases comprising the observation. For example, there were only two cases with prior criminal records
and evidentiary strength equal to one. Principal results of interest are the gap between
cases with and without record at evidentiary strength equal to three and the absence of
such a gap at other evidentiary strengths.

One quirk is the 50% conviction rate for evidentiary strength equal to
one, the case with the weakest evidence favoring conviction. But, as
the small size of the shaded circle for that evidentiary value suggests,
this rate is based on only two cases and one conviction. Interestingly,
the conviction was one in which the jury learned of a criminal record.82 The most striking conviction rate is for cases with evidence
strength equal to three in which the jury learned about a criminal
record. Despite the relatively weak evidence, the conviction rate exceeded 60%, far greater than the rate for cases with evidentiary
strength equal to three in which the jury did not learn about a criminal record, and far greater than the conviction rate for evidentiary
82
The case was in the Bronx, involved illegal drug sales, and had two counts. The
judge predicted that the jury would find the defendant guilty on some charges and not
guilty on others. The jury acquitted on one count and convicted on the other. The judge
assigned the conviction an evidentiary strength of two but reported being “very satisfied”
with the jury’s decision. The jurors’ report of low evidentiary strength was based on the
report of only two jurors. Note that, as reported in Part II, the Bronx had a noticeably
lower juror-response rate than the other sites.
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strength equal to two. Unlike the minuscule sample for evidentiary
strength equal to one, the surprisingly high conviction rate at evidentiary strength three is based on eleven cases. A similar pattern, shown
in Appendix Figure 1, emerges if one uses the judges’ measure of evidentiary strength rather than the juries’ measure. The distributions
of perceived evidence strength differ for juries and judges.83 In line
with this differential pattern, Appendix Figure 1 shows that the pattern shifts downward somewhat so that the key divergence between
cases in which juries do and do not learn about a defendant’s criminal
record is now at the judge’s evidentiary strength level of two.
B. Regression Models of Conviction
Regression models in Table 9 explore whether the pattern in Figure 1 survives more rigorous statistical modeling. The models seek to
explore whether knowledge of past criminal record influences a dichotomous outcome, whether any conviction resulted. We again limit
the sample to cases in which defendants have criminal records. The
controls, which vary across models, include evidentiary strength, gender, minority status, and type of crime.84
The pattern across the regression models confirms the pattern
suggested by Figure 1. Stratifying the data’s evidentiary strength indicates that jury knowledge of prior criminal history is significantly associated with conviction in weak cases and not significantly associated
with conviction in strong cases. The models in Table 9 control for
evidentiary strength, account for county-level effects through dummy
variables, and cluster standard errors by case type.
83
See Eisenberg, Hannaford-Agor, Hans, Waters, Munsterman, Schwab & Wells, supra
note 54, at 186–89 tbl.4, figs.1, 2.
84
For purposes of these models, DUI and attempted-murder convictions were included with the case type “Other” due to the lack of variation for these case types given the
other variables in the models. We also ran (1) two-level random intercept logistic models
with separate intercepts for each case type and county fixed effects and (2) three-level
random intercept models with intercepts for case type and county. These models yield
results similar to those in Table 9 except that, in the three-level model for the sample
limited to evidentiary strength > 3.5, the coefficients and standard errors appear to be
unstably large. Other models, not reported here, employ systems of two equations. The
goal in those models was to account for the endogeneity of juries’ learning of past criminal
history. The first equations modeled whether jurors learned of criminal record. As shown
in Tables 4 and 7 above, this is largely a function of whether the defendant testified. The
second equations model conviction after correcting for the nonrandom pattern of juries’
learning about criminal history. We found that, measured by a standard model assessment
criterion (the Akaike information criterion, see GELMAN & HILL, supra note 77, at 525), the
second equations in multiequation models were inferior to similar single-equation models
that did not include an adjustment. The extra parameter introduced by the adjustment is
not worth the gain in explanatory power that accompanies adding an additional parameter. Models using fixed effects for case types are not satisfactory because of the reduced
sample models’ lack of variation.

R
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OF

CONVICTION
(3)

Dependent variable = jury convicted (0=no, 1=yes)
Full sample Evidence strength ≤ 3.5 Evidence strength > 3.5
Evidentiary strength

1.705**
(7.41)

Jury learned criminal history

0.942
(1.11)

Site=Los Angeles

1.317†
(1.83)

Site=Maricopa

1.314†
(1.77)

Site=Bronx

1.793*

0.411
(0.81)
1.624*
(2.52)

2.272*
(2.20)
−0.116
(0.12)

1.666

1.615

(1.24)

(1.09)

1.973

1.606

(1.21)

(1.40)

2.439†

1.190

(2.23)

(1.83)

(1.10)

−7.146**

−4.658†

−9.325*

(6.80)

(1.92)

(2.01)

Site=D.C. (reference category)
Constant
Observations
Case types treatment
Correctly classified
Goodness of fit p-value

214

58

156

cluster

cluster

cluster

89.7%

74.1%

92.3%

0.388

0.411

0.014

Note: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001. Table reports coefficients with tstatistics in parentheses; † indicates p < 0.10, * p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. Models cluster standard
errors by case type and use county fixed effects. Goodness-of-fit p-value is based on HosmerLemeshow statistic with 10 groups.

Model (1) includes all cases involving a defendant with a criminal
record. Although Model (1) shows no significant criminal record effects, the other two models show that this full-sample story is seriously
incomplete. Model (2) limits the sample to cases with weak evidence
against the defendant. According to the average of individual juror
reports of evidentiary strength, these cases had evidentiary strength of
less than or equal to 3.5 on the one-to-seven scale. This model shows
that the evidentiary-strength variable does not approach statistical significance in weak cases. This is consistent with the non-monotonically
increasing pattern of conviction rates at the low end of evidentiary
strength in Figure 1. Thus, most of the contribution to the significance of the evidentiary-strength variable is from cases with strong evidence, those with average evidentiary strength exceeding 3.5. This is
confirmed by the large statistically significant coefficients on the evidentiary-strength variable in the sample limited to strong cases, as
shown in Model (3). Model (2) does show a substantial, significant,
positive association between learning of a criminal record and conviction. This too is consistent with the separation of cases in which jurors
did or did not learn of the defendant’s criminal record in Figure 1.

\\server05\productn\C\CRN\94-6\CRN602.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 33

TAKING A STAND ON TAKING THE STAND

15-SEP-09

13:39

1385

The magnitude of the effect of knowledge of criminal record can
be strikingly large. In Model (2), in cases that round to evidentiary
value three, the marginal effect of knowledge of criminal conviction
in the District of Columbia is to increase the probability of conviction
by 0.36. The corresponding increase is 0.30 in Los Angeles, 0.32 in
Maricopa, and 0.10 in the Bronx.85 As the overall probability of conviction at evidentiary level three without a criminal record is just below 0.20,86 the presence of a criminal record increases the probability
of conviction from less than 20% to about 50% or greater. In contrast, at rounded evidentiary level four in Model (3), the marginal effect of knowledge of a criminal conviction is small and insignificant in
all four jurisdictions.
Additional models that control for gender and minority status,
not reported here, do not yield results materially different from those
reported here. But reduced sample models that include these variables cannot include all observations because of lack of variation in
outcome across gender and minority status. The small numbers of
white defendants and female defendants, as shown in Tables 1 and 4
above, prevent systematic inclusion of these variables across the full
range of models. Results are also not attributable to a single locale.
Together, these results suggest that in strong cases—cases that
have crossed the jury’s evidentiary threshold of 3.5—variations in evidentiary strength continue to contribute to the probability of conviction. The existence of a prior criminal record does not materially
contribute to conviction probability. In weak cases, cases with evidence less than or equal to 3.5, the dominant tendency is not to convict. But, in the strongest of weak cases, the existence of a prior
criminal record can prompt a jury to convict. The prior record effectively leverages the existing evidence over the threshold needed to
support conviction.
The core results can be shown simply in Table 10, which contains
the conviction rate for the bifurcated levels of evidentiary strength,
further subdivided by whether the jury learned of the defendant’s
criminal record.
C. Discussion of Results
We now consider the results in light of the theoretical reasons in
Part I suggesting why prior record is important. Subject to the limitations of a nonexperimental design, our findings most directly support
the fourth theoretical basis for believing prior record to be important.
85
Similar probability increases occur at lower evidentiary-strength levels, but the
weaker evidence in those cases presumably limits the power of a criminal record to result
in a conviction.
86
See supra fig.1.
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TABLE 10. JURY KNOWLEDGE OF PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD
AND CONVICTION
Number not convicted

Number convicted

% convicted

EVIDENCE STRENGTH ≤ 3.5
Jury did not learn of record

32

7

18.0

Jury learned of record

12

9

42.9*

11

109

90.8

3

41

93.2

EVIDENCE STRENGTH >3.5
Jury did not learn of record
Jury learned of record

Note: Sample is limited to cases with defendants who had criminal records. Strength of evidence
is coded on a one-to-seven Likert scale, with higher values indicating evidence more favorable to
the prosecution. Strength of evidence is average for each case based on juror reports. For
significance level, * indicates statistical significance at <0.05 using mid-p exact test.

The conviction threshold appears to differ for defendants with and
without criminal records. As Figure 1 and the regression models suggest, jurors appear willing to convict on less strong other evidence if
the defendant has a criminal past.
The results also help identify the cases in which the shifted conviction threshold has most effect. A prior record plays little role in
cases with strong or even average (value four) evidence, hence the
small differences in conviction rates at evidence values four through
seven between cases with and without juror knowledge of criminal record information. Nor does prior criminal record often play an outcome-determinative role in cases with evidence too far below the
conviction threshold of about four. Hence the small difference at evidence value two between cases with and without juror knowledge of
criminal records and the low conviction rates for both classes of cases.
But for cases with evidentiary value close to, but below, the threshold
of four, a prior criminal record can lead to conviction.
One could view a prior record as “making up” for evidentiary deficiencies. Or, one might view the prior record as evidence tending to
suggest guilt. Under either view, the prior record makes a difference.
That the record effect occurs primarily in cases in which the evidence
is not overwhelming resonates with Kalven and Zeisel’s classic finding
that extralegal factors have the most impact primarily in close, as opposed to clear, cases.87
One can also assess the theory that prior record changes the
meaning of evidence rather than shifting the conviction threshold. As
suggested earlier, jurors may internalize knowledge of a criminal record into an overall view of the case as having stronger evidence favoring conviction. We hypothesized on the basis of the experimental jury
research that knowledge of criminal history could directly affect the
jurors’ (and even judges’) perceptions of evidentiary strength. We
87

See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 40, at 133–35.

R
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also noted that the impact of criminal record on juror judgments
about evidence might be difficult to detect because, if it operates as
hypothesized, it would already be incorporated into jurors’ perceptions of the strength of the case.
With that as a cautionary comment, the relation between evidentiary strength and knowledge of criminal record seems more consistent with the threshold theory. Cases in which jurors learned of
criminal records tend to have slightly lower perceived evidentiary
strength than cases in which jurors lacked knowledge of criminal
records, as shown in Table 8. When the defendant testified, cases
ending in conviction had average evidentiary strength of 4.96 (knowledge of record) and 5.40 (no knowledge of record); cases ending in
acquittal had average evidentiary strength of 2.79 (knowledge of record) and 3.10 (no knowledge of record). If knowledge of a criminal
record changes the meaning of evidence towards conviction, it does
so in a way that increases evidentiary strength merely to the level of,
but not beyond, evidentiary strength in cases in which jurors do not
learn of criminal records. Perhaps prosecutors viewed existence of
prior convictions as warranting prosecution of otherwise weaker cases.
In addition to the lower conviction threshold, we also find evidence of a negative halo effect. Jurors were asked, on a one-to-seven
scale, the degree of sympathy they had for defendants. In a regression
model of the degree of sympathy as a function of knowledge of a criminal record, a statistically significant (p = 0.023) negative association
existed between sympathy and record. In a model that includes evidentiary strength as an explanatory variable, the relation becomes
more significant (p = 0.008). Results do not materially change if we
also control for case type and defendant race and sex. But adding the
degree of sympathy as an explanatory variable in close cases, those in
Model (2) in Table 9, does not yield a statistically significant coefficient. Jurors may feel more negatively about defendants with criminal
records, but that reduced respect does not help explain the conviction pattern in close cases.
With respect to the effect of prior record on credibility, we do not
find evidence that criminal records affect defendant credibility. Jurors were asked to rate the believability of the defendant’s evidence
on a one-to-seven scale. In cases in which defendants testified, criminal record was not significantly associated with the degree of believability. This was so whether or not one controlled for jurors’
perceptions of the strength of the evidence. This noneffect may of
course be attributable to defendants’ being selective about the cases
in which they testified. In cases in which testifying would be most
damaging to credibility, defendants may simply decline to testify.
However, it is worth noting the convergence of this finding with the
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experimental research. In the jury experiments reviewed earlier that
varied a defendant’s criminal record, the evidence in the case and the
other characteristics and testimony of the defendant were held constant. In those controlled circumstances, researchers did not typically
find strong links between the presence of a criminal record and
changes in the defendant’s credibility.
The absence of an association between criminal record and credibility is deeply troubling given the theory underlying allowing impeachment based on a defendant’s criminal record.88 In most
instances, the justification for allowing the use of a prior criminal record is to facilitate assessing the defendant’s credibility.89 Thus, “the
government might show that the defendant had been convicted of a
crime, to affect his credibility as a witness, but for no other purpose.”90
If, as our results and experimental results suggest, prior record affects
case outcomes but not credibility, the historical justification for allowing the use of criminal records is unfounded.
CONCLUSION
Avoiding conviction of the innocent is a preeminent goal of the
criminal justice system.91 Lord Patrick Devlin’s oft-quoted statement
captures much of the spirit underlying the jury-trial guarantee: “Trial
by jury is not an instrument for getting at the truth; it is a process
designed to make it as sure as possible that no innocent man is convicted.”92 As of this writing, over 200 post-conviction exonerations
based on DNA evidence have been documented.93 The number of
erroneous convictions is likely much higher because of the difficulty
of establishing innocence in cases that do not involve DNA.94
Experimental and real-world data, as confirmed by this study, uniformly suggest that knowledge of defendants’ prior records promotes
conviction in close cases, those where one should be most concerned
about erroneous convictions. The criminal-record effect could be
even stronger than we have found in these analyses; the experimental
work suggests that having a record for a similar offense creates the
88

We thank Geoffrey Stone for pointing this out.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gorham, 99 Mass. 420, 21 (1868) (“The defendant . . . offered himself as a witness, and the rules of evidence affecting the competency or
credibility of witnesses were all applicable to him in that character.”).
90
Commonwealth v. Bonner, 97 Mass. 587, 588 (1867) (describing the trial judge’s
ruling).
91
Givelber, supra note 48, at 1172 (stating that “[n]o one wants to participate in a
practice that they believe routinely imprisons the innocent”).
92
Lord Devlin, The Criminal Trial and Appeal in England, Address at the University
of Chicago for the Third Dedicatory Conference (Jan. 1960), quoted in KALVEN & ZEISEL,
supra note 40, at 190.
93
See The Innocence Project, supra note 8.
94
See Gross et al., supra note 8, at 524.
89
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most bias, and we had information only about the presence of a defendant’s criminal record, not its type. Together, our results and experimental results indicate that the historical basis for allowing prior
record evidence—to challenge the defendant’s credibility—has little
empirical support.
The enhanced conviction probability that prior record evidence
supplies in close cases may well contribute to erroneous convictions.
A recent analysis of DNA exonerations suggests that many erroneously
convicted defendants refrain from testifying because they fear the
negative consequences of having their criminal records made known
to the jury; while at the same time, juries who learn of the criminal
records of innocent defendants who do testify are likely biased by the
record information.95 This bias suggests the value of exploring the
development of legal rules that encourage defendants, even those
with criminal records, to testify.96 Although eliminating all testimony
about prior criminal records is unrealistic, prosecutors making charging decisions and judges considering the prejudicial effect of prior
records should take into account the dramatic effect that knowledge
of criminal record can have in close cases. Similarly, criminal defense
attorneys should think long and hard about having clients testify in
what they believe juries might regard as close cases.

95

See Blume, supra note 3, at 490–91.
Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal Rules That Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 882–96 (2008) (proposing legal reforms
that arguably would make it more attractive for defendants with criminal records to testify
at trial by, for example, prohibiting all mention of prior convictions or allowing in limine
motions to exclude prior-conviction impeachment in exchange for the defendant’s commitment to testify).
96
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APPENDIX FIGURE 1.
CONVICTION RATE AS FUNCTION OF:
EVIDENTIARY STRENGTH (PER JUDGE) &
KNOWLEDGE OF RECORD
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